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ROADSIDE PHOTO OF TRAFFIC 
VIOLATOR REASONABLE 
R. v. Multani, 2002 BCSC 68 
 
A police officer pulled over a van for 
 
When [the officer] observed [the accused] at the scene it 
was his duty to identify him properly, and in the course of 
doing so to make and record accurate evidence of identity.  
 
In the course of doing so, he could make notes of his 
observations, and he could have made a sketch in his notes 
had he chosen to do so. Generally, a photograph will provide failing to stop at a yellow light contrary 
to the Motor Vehicle Act (MVA). 
Following a request by the officer, the 
accused provided the vehicle’s insurance but was unable 
to produce his driver’s licence. After obtaining the 
driver’s name, address and date of birth, the officer 
returned to his patrol car to get his Polaroid camera. 
The officer approached the accused, told the accused to 
look at him, and took a picture. The officer printed the 
driver’s name and the violation ticket number on the 
bottom of the photo. The officer testified that people 
who have failed to produce driver’s licences in the past 
have given false names and to properly identify drivers 
he carries a Polaroid camera to take a photo of the 
driver to keep with his notes. After the photograph was 
taken the officer learned the accused was a prohibited 
driver under the MVA. The photograph was not 
published or circulated. The accused was convicted at 
trial of prohibited driving and appealed to the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia arguing, among other grounds, 
that the trial judge erred in concluding the taking of the 
photograph did not violate the accused’s right to be free 
from unreasonable search or seizure. 
 
After reviewing numerous cases concerning the taking of 
photographs, the appeal Court found that the accused 
was not charged with an indictable offence and 
therefore the Identification of Criminals Act (ICA) did 
not justify the taking of the photograph. However, in 
recognizing that not every person investigated will be 
charged and that “proper identification evidence assists 
in identifying the innocent as well as the guilty”, there 
was “no reason to infer from the [ICA], that parliament 
meant to abolish photographing of suspects as an 
investigative tool in summary conviction cases”. In 
finding the taking of the photograph reasonable, Curtis 
J. held, at para. 23: 
 
 
 
 
evidence that is more reliable than notes or sketches. 
Because traffic enforcement officers had frequently 
experienced drivers unable to produce driver's licences, 
giving false names, [the officer] and others had adopted a 
practice of taking Polaroid pictures which they did not 
publish, but kept solely for the purpose of their own notes. 
As this case does not come within the ambit of the 
Identification of Criminals Act, I find it to be 
distinguishable from the cases to which that Act applies. 
In those circumstances, I find the reasoning of the B.C. 
Court of Appeal in the R. v. Dilling case is applicable. There 
has been no unreasonable search and seizure, and the 
photograph is properly admissible. 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
STREET CHECK & PHOTO NOT A 
DETENTION 
R. v. Acosta-Medina, 2002 BCCA 33 
 
The accused appealed his conviction 
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February 2002 for trafficking in cocaine by arguing 
his s.10(b) right to counsel was 
violated. Police were engaged in an 
undercover operation designed to clean up a notorious 
drug trafficking area. Police made a buy from the 
accused who was subsequently checked by other 
officers on the pretext of an immigration inquiry. The 
officer who made the purchase drove by, confirmed 
the accused as the seller, and a Polaroid photograph 
was taken. No Charter warnings were given to the 
accused and he was then let go until the end of the 
operation. The accused argued police detained him 
when they did the drive by confirmation and took his 
photograph and this identification evidence, which 
supported the conviction, should be excluded under 
s.24(2) of the Charter because the police failed to 
properly advise him of his right to counsel. 
 The British Columbia Court of Appeal found the 
accused had not been detained. The burden of proving 
detention on a balance of probabilities rests with the 
accused and he failed to satisfy the test of physical or 
psychological restraint. “[A]n encounter with the police 
does not become a detention just because it provided 
an opportunity for the police to identify a subject”; 
simply because “a suspect is identified and 
photographed does not mean that he was restrained”.  
 
In recognizing that “"detention" in s. 10(b) must be 
understood in light of the purpose of the provision, 
namely to guarantee the opportunity to obtain the 
assistance of counsel in situations where it is 
reasonably required”, the Court found “the police 
objective [in this case] could not have compromised the 
appellant's s. 10(b) right to counsel”; “the police 
secured the identification evidence without requiring 
any self-incriminatory participation by the [accused]”. 
At para. 13 Donald J.A. for the unanimous Court 
stated: 
 
The [accused] was with the identification team for only 
about three to four minutes. He was already on the 
street open to view by anyone who wished to see him. In 
my opinion, this is not a situation where it makes any 
practical sense to speak in terms of the assistance of 
counsel. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
ASSAULT CBH: INJURY MUST 
RESULT FROM UNLAWFUL 
ASSAULT 
R. v. Lafleur, 2001 BCCA 475 
 
The accused’s stepdaughter (the 
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pushed the victim’s hand as she tried to evict him from 
his own home. However, pushing the victim down the 
stairs was unreasonable force, and thus an assault. On 
appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal found the 
evidence failed to establish whether the bone was 
broken at the time the accused was defending himself 
(pushing the victim’s hand away), or at the time he 
assaulted the victim by throwing her down the stairs.   
As a result, the Court set aside the conviction for 
assault causing bodily harm and substituted a conviction 
of “simple assault”. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
PROSTITUTION DOES NOT 
REQUIRE PHYSICAL CONTACT 
R. v. St. Onge et al., 
(2001) 155 CCC (3d) 517 (QueCA) 
 
The accused were convicted of 
keeping a common bawdy house. 
They operated a business where 
customers would pay $40 for a 20-
minute erotic dance in a private room where a dancer 
would masturbate herself (for an additional fee) and 
where the customer could masturbate himself; 
touching between the two was prohibited. The accused 
argued that sexual contact is required for the act of 
prostitution and because there was no such contact 
between the dancer and the customer the offence had 
not been made out. The Court recognized prostitution 
itself does not amount to a criminal offence, but 
remains prohibited in the context of solicitation, 
common bawdy houses, and procuring. In adopting the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s definition of prostitution, 
“the offering by a person of his or her body for 
lewdness for payment in return”, the Quebec Court of 
V
Fvictim of the alleged assault) had 
attempted to walk the accused to 
the front door of his own residence 
in an effort to make him leave. The 
ccused had been drinking and was bothering the victim’s 
other, who was also present in the house. The 
tepdaughter placed her hand on the accused’s back, but 
id not use much force. The accused did not cooperate 
nd attempted to push his stepdaughter’s hand away. At 
he door, the accused grabbed her shirt, swore at her, 
nd threw her down the steps. The victim broke a bone 
n her finger during this incident. At trial, the accused 
as convicted of assault causing bodily harm. The trial 
udge found the accused used reasonable force when he 
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ancer stimulated the customer by engaging in various 
exual acts) rendered in return for payment for the 
exual gratification of the customer (masturbating 
hemselves in most cases); physical contact is not 
ecessary. Furthermore, the accused argued that it 
ust also be established that the act of prostitution is 
ndecent. The Court rejected this assertion holding 
hat the act of prostitution is essentially 
haracterized as “a paid sexual activity” and “it is not 
nherent in the act of prostitution that it be indecent”. 
he appeal was dismissed. 
2
 REASONABLE GROUNDS FROM 
INFORMANT TIP: SEARCH 
INCIDENT TO ARREST 
REASONABLE 
R. v. Warford, 2001 NFCA 64 
 
Police received a tip from a proven 
and reliable informant that the 
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The Crown appealed the ruling to the Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal which concluded the trial judge erred in 
failing to apply the proper analysis in assessing whether 
the arrest was lawful. The unanimous appellate Court 
applied the threefold test in assessing the 
reasonableness of the search incidental to arrest: 
 
• Was the arrest lawful? 
• Was the search incidental to arrest? 
• Was the search conducted in a reasonable manner? 
V
Faccused would be driving to a local 
nightclub, at a particular time, to sell 
cocaine. The informant told police 
hat the accused had received a shipment of cocaine on 
ugust 24, that customers would phone him for delivery, 
hat the accused had sold a substantial amount of 
ocaine at a named nightclub on August 27, and that he 
lways carried cocaine with him for sale. In addition, the 
nformant told police that on September 3 the accused 
ould be driving a black pickup truck from his residence 
t about 11:00 pm to the nightclub to sell cocaine. Police 
et up surveillance of the accused’s home at 9:00 pm to 
orroborate the information of the informant. Neither 
etween this time and 11:10 pm, when the accused left 
is residence driving the truck, was anyone seen 
ntering or leaving the residence or approach the black 
ickup truck parked at the residence. The police 
ollowed the accused, who was driving a route consistent 
ith going to the nightclub, and stopped him a short 
istance away from the nightclub because they felt they 
ay encounter difficulties in securing the evidence if 
he accused was arrested at the nightclub. 
he police confirmed the accused’s identity, placed him 
nder arrest for possession of cocaine for the purpose 
f trafficking, and conducted a frisk search that 
esulted in the discovery of 6 half-gram packets of 
ocaine. The truck was impounded and the accused’s 
esidence was later searched under a warrant where a 
uantity of cocaine, cash, and scales were seized. 
t trial, the judge found the accused’s s.8 Charter right 
o be secure against unreasonable search or seizure had 
een violated because the arrest was made on “the mere 
uspicion of drug trafficking” and not based on 
easonable grounds; thus the search incident to the 
nlawful arrest was unreasonable. Furthermore, the 
vidence from the search could not be relied upon to 
upport the search of the accused’s home; the warrant 
as tainted by the improper search of the accused’s 
erson. As a result, the evidence was excluded under 
.24(2) of the Charter and the accused was acquitted.  
 
Was the arrest lawful? 
 
An arrest under s.495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code 
requires a belief based on reasonable grounds. Although 
the evidence of a tip itself is insufficient to establish 
reasonable grounds, hearsay information can provide 
reasonable grounds if it is sufficiently reliable and 
credible (which cannot be provided by the results of the 
search), and the proper two prong analysis for 
reasonable grounds is satisfied: 
 
1. Does the police officer from a subjective 
perspective have reasonable grounds for arrest? and 
 
2. Could a reasonable person in the position of the 
officer conclude there were reasonable grounds for 
the arrest? 
 
In this case, the officer, from a subjective perspective, 
had reasonable grounds to believe the accused was about 
to commit an indictable offence (trafficking in cocaine 
at the nightclub). The information provided by the 
informant and some of its verification by surveillance 
was sufficient from a subjective viewpoint that 
reasonable grounds existed. 
 
The objective test was also satisfied based on the 
totality of the following factors: 
 
• The information provided a significant amount of 
detail including when the shipment was received, the 
price the accused was selling it for, the mode of 
delivery, that the accused drove a black pickup truck, 
that the accused always carried cocaine with him for 
sale, and that the accused would be going to a named 
nightclub and would be arriving there at 11:00 pm. 
 
• The police confirmed much of the information prior to 
acting on it such as a truck matching the description 
was parked in the driveway, the truck was driven by 
the accused when he was stopped, the accused left his 
residence at 11:10 pm, and the accused was followed 
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 by police on a route consistent with going to the 
nightclub. 
 
• The police regarded the informant as a credible and 
reliable source who had previously provided 
information proven to be reliable on numerous 
occasions over the past 18 months. 
 
Succinctly, both the subjective and objective 
components of reasonable grounds were satisfied and 
the arrest was held to be lawful. 
 
Was the search incident to arrest? 
 
This phase involves assessing whether “the police [had] 
an objectively reasonable rationale, related to the 
arrest, for conducting the search”. In this case, the 
purposes of the search were to protect the police 
through the detection of weapons and to discover 
evidence (cocaine); both valid objectives of a search 
incidental to arrest.  
  
Was the search conducted in a reasonable 
manner? 
 
The frisk search conducted would be an appropriate 
manner of proceeding in this case and there was no 
suggestion by the accused that the search was not 
carried out in a reasonable manner. 
 
Since the arrest was lawful and the resultant search 
reasonable, the evidence seized as a consequence could 
properly be used to support the issuance of a search 
warrant for the accused’s home. In allowing the appeal 
the Court remitted the matter back to the Supreme 
Court for a new trial. 
 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL: 
UNDERSTANDING YOUR 
DUTIES 
Part 2 of 2 
 Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
IMPLEMENTATIONAL DUTIES 
 
Duty to Accommodate 
 
Once the police have complied with the informational 
requirements of s.10(b)1 there are no correlative duties 
triggered which require the police to provide an 
opportunity unless the person indicates a desire to 
exercise their right2. The police are not obligated to 
assume that a person will exercise the right to counsel 
nor can the police be expected to guess whether a 
decision has been made to exercise or to waive the 
right3. If the person does not claim or assert in a 
comprehensible way their right to counsel, the right to 
counsel is deemed to be waived4 and the police may 
continue with their investigation.  
                                                 
1 See Volume 2 Issue 1 
 
Waiver 
 
A detainee or arrestee may waive their right to retain 
and instruct counsel either explicitly or implicitly. 
Where the waiver is implicit, the standard will be very 
high5. Simply responding to questions 
after being advised of the right to 
counsel cannot normally be taken to be 
a waiver of that right6.  Nor is there an 
implicit waiver where, despite the 
person requesting counsel, the police 
persist with questioning and the person 
responds by answering. Where a person positively 
asserts their desire to contact counsel and the police 
ignore the request and proceed to question the person, 
a person is likely to feel that their right has no effect 
and that they must answer. In such a case the person 
has the right not to be asked questions and will not be 
deemed to have implicitly waived their right simply by 
answering the questions7. 
 
The waiver of the right to counsel must pass an 
awareness of consequences test. If this test has not 
been met, continued questioning will constitute a 
violation of s.10(b). There is an obligation on the police 
to delay questioning until the person is of sufficient 
capacity to exercise their right to counsel or is aware 
of the consequences of waiving that right8. Therefore, 
s.10(b) requires that a person be advised of their right 
to counsel at a time when they can understand their 
right9. For a waiver to be effective, the Crown must 
prove that the person had a full understanding of the 
                                                 
2 R. v. Baig [1987] 2 S.C.R. 537 (S.C.C.), R. v. Woods (1989) 49 C.C.C. (3d) 20 (Ont. 
C.A.) at p. 29-30. 
3 R. v. Hollis (1992) 76 C.C.C. (3d) 421 (B.C.C.A.) at p.435. 
4 R. v. Baig (1985) 20 C.C.C. (3d) 515 (Ont.C.A.) affirmed [1987] 2 S.C.R. 537 
(S.C.C.) at p.523, R. v. Hollis (1992) 76 C.C.C. (3d) 421 (B.C.C.A.) at p.435. 
5 R. v. Brydges [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.). 
6 R. v. Whittle (1994) 92 C.C.C. (3d) 11 (S.C.C.) at p.36. 
7 R. v. Manninen [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233 (S.C.C.). 
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8 R. v. Clarkson [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383 (S.C.C.) . 
9 R. v. Cotter  (1991) 62 C.C.C. (3d) 423 (B.C.C.A.) at p.430. 
 right to counsel and an awareness of the consequences 
associated with waiving that right10. 
 
Where the person to whom the police seek to question 
does not meet the awareness threshold, it is incumbent 
on the police to cease questioning until the person is of 
sufficient capacity to meet the test. Certain types of 
people will generally be found not to have the capacity 
to waive their right to counsel due to their state of 
mind or limited ability to understand the nature of 
their jeopardy or their right to counsel.  An operating 
mind requires the limited cognitive capacity of a person 
to11: 
• communicate with counsel, 
• understand the function of counsel, and 
• understand that the right to counsel can be waived 
even if this is not in their best interests. 
 
It is not necessary that the person possess analytical 
ability.  The inquiry does not go so far as to determine 
whether the person is capable of making a good or wise 
choice or a choice that is in their best interests. 
However, it is incumbent on the police to make sure 
that the person fully understands the right to counsel 
and the consequences of waiving it.  Diminished 
capacity may include circumstances where the person 
suffers from: 
 
• intoxication  
• mental illness  
• emotional distress 
• lack of sophistication. 
 
Although the police are to respect the right to 
counsel12 they are not the guardians of the solicitor 
client relationship13 and are not "required to insist on 
consultation with counsel14". However, the police are 
required to provide the person with a reasonable 
time period, dependent on the circumstances, within 
which to decide whether to exercise the right to 
counsel15.   In most cases the decision to contact 
counsel will be made reasonably quickly. If a person 
chooses to invoke or exercise their right to counsel, 
the police have two corresponding implementational 
obligations16: 
                                                                                                 
10 See also R. v. Nugent (1988) 42 C.C.C. (3d) 431 (N.S.C.A.) at p.455., R. v. Evans 
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 869. 
11 R. v. Whittle (1994) 92 C.C.C. (3d) 11 (S.C.C.) at p.30-31. 
12 R. v. Nugent (1988) 42 C.C.C. (3d) 431 (N.S.C.A.) at p.460-461. 
13 R. v. Bain (1989) 47 C.C.C. (3d) 250 (Ont.C.A.) 
14 R. v. Charron (1990) 57 C.C.C. (3d) (Que. C.A.) at p.254, see also R. v. Ferron 
(1989) 49 C.C.C.  (3d) 432 (B.C.C.A.) per Taggart J.A. at p. 441. 
15 R. v. Hollis (1992) 76 C.C.C. (3d) 421 (B.C.C.A.) 
16 R. v. Bartle [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.), R. v. Manninen (1987) 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 
(S.C.C.), R. v. Ross [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), R. v. Cho 2000 BCCA 658 at para. 43. 
• to provide the person a reasonable opportunity 
(except in urgent and dangerous circumstances) 
to retain and instruct counsel without delay; and 
 
• to cease questioning or otherwise eliciting 
evidence until this opportunity has been provided  
 
It is important to recognize that the right to counsel 
under s.10(b) is not absolute. The implementational 
duties are not triggered unless and until the person 
indicates a desire to exercise their right to counsel17. 
The standard question "do you want to call a lawyer?" 
provides the person an opportunity to assert their 
desire to contact counsel. Where the person clearly 
and unequivocally says "No" when asked whether they 
want to call a lawyer, no further obligations are 
triggered under s.10(b)18 beyond advising the person of 
their rights19. Unless the person invokes the right to 
counsel and is reasonably diligent in exercising it, the 
duty to provide an opportunity and cease questioning 
will not arise or will be suspended20. 
 
In circumstances where the person is uncertain 
whether to contact counsel, the police are obligated to 
pursue the issue further and either obtain a clear and 
unequivocal waiver or afford the person a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise their right21.  
 
Reasonable Opportunity 
 
A person in the control of the police cannot exercise 
their right to counsel unless the police provide a 
reasonable opportunity to do so. Section 10(b) imposes 
a duty on the police to provide a person with a 
reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to retain 
and instruct counsel22. This duty requires the police to 
facilitate the person's realization of their right23. A 
person in the control of the police cannot exercise 
their right to counsel unless the police provide a 
reasonable opportunity to do so. The duty to provide a 
reasonable opportunity imports two aspects24: 
 
• the person must be afforded the means to contact 
counsel. This includes the duty of the police to offer 
 
17 R. v. Bartle [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.) 
18 R. v. Matheson [1994] 3 S.C.R. 328 (S.C.C.) 
19 R. v. Rube (1992) 10 B.C.A.C. 48 (B.C.C.A.) 
20 R. v. Bartle [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.), R. v. Black [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138 (S.C.C.), R. 
v. Tremblay [1987] 2 S.C.R. 435 (S.C.C.), R. v Brydges [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.) 
21 R. V. Small 1998 ABCA 85 
22 R. v. Barbon (1986) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 259 (B.C.C.A.) at p.263, R. v Brydges [1990] 1 
S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), R. v. Naugler (1986) 27 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (N.S.C.A.) at p.263. 
23 R. v. Kennedy (1995) 103 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (Nfld.C.A.) at p.184 
24 See R. v. Smith (1988) 43 C.C.C. (3d) 379 per McLachlin J.A. in dissent. 
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the use of a telephone that is 
operative25 and to assist the 
person in making the telephone 
call where the accused is 
physically unable to do so.  An 
injured person, such as an impaired driver involved in 
a motor vehicle accident and transported to hospital, 
may require special arrangements to exercise their 
right to counsel26. 
 
• the person must be afforded a reasonable time 
within which to contact counsel. 
What constitutes a reasonable 
time varies with the 
circumstances of each case. The 
amount of time permitted for 
contacting counsel must not be arb
to meet the convenience of the poli
to obtain incriminating evide
circumstances in determining wha
reasonable time include the conditio
(eg. drunkeness), the presence or ab
in proceeding immediately with the
questioning, and the availability of
time of arrest or detention. For e
apparent that further efforts in r
will be futile, the person can no l
provide a breath sample by invok
under s.10(b) of the Charter27. 
 
 
Cease Questioning 
 
Once a person h
right to counsel, t
compel the pers
decision or pa
process which c
have an adverse
conduct of an eventual trial until that 
reasonable opportunity to exercise th
important reason of retaining legal adv
is linked to the protection against se
For this reason there is a duty to c
until the person has had a reasonabl
retain and instruct counsel29. For the 
to be effective, the person must hav
legal advice before they are questioned or otherwise 
required to provide evidence30. The police are obliged 
to "hold off" from attempting to elicit incriminatory 
evidence such as confessions, identification line-ups31, 
and breath or blood samples from the person until they 
have had a reasonable opportunity to reach counsel32.  
                                                 
25 R. v. Manninen (1987) 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.), R. v. Ro
274 (B.C.C.A.). 
26 R. v. Nesheim (1998) Docket:CA022056 (B.C.C.A.) 
27 R. v. Dunnett (1990) 62 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (N.B.C.A.) at p.23. 
28 R. v. Black [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138 (S.C.C.), R. v. Ross [1989] 
Prosper [1994] 3 S..R. 236 (S.C.C.). 
29 R. v Brydges [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.). 
 
Circumstances may arise where a sense of urgency may 
justify the police in questioning the person without 
providing that person with a reasonable opportunity to 
consult counsel. Where questioning is imperative to 
counter the risk of harm to others, questioning without 
affording a reasonable time to consult counsel may be 
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Right to Be Afforded Privacy 
 
The police must afford an arrested 
or detained person the right to 
speak in private to counsel when 
they exercise their right to speak 
to a lawyer34. Providing a person 
with a reasonable opportunity presumes an adequate 
measure of privacy being provided to the person in 
exercising their right to counsel35. There is no 
obligation on the person to request or inquire as to the 
right to consult in private36. The right to privacy 
includes the following two elements37: 
 
• the right to privacy is inherent in the right to 
counsel38 (the onus is on the police to provide privacy 
regardless of whether privacy is explicitly 
requested)   
 
• the right to privacy begins after the person has 
contacted counsel for advice (i.e. once the lawyer is 
in a position to offer advice).   
 
The right to privacy however, is not an entitlement to 
absolute privacy.  It simply means that the person has 
the right to consult counsel under circumstances where 
the conversation cannot be overheard or where there 
is no reasonable apprehension of being overheard39. A 
                                                 
30 R. v. Manninen [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233 (S.C.C.). 
31 R. v. Ross [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
32 R. v. Prosper [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.). 
33 See R. v. Smith (1988) 43 C.C.C. (3d) 379 per McLachlin J.A. in dissent at p.394 
34 R. v. R. (P.L.) (1988) 44 C.C.C. (3d) 174 (N.S.C.A.) per Macdonald J.A. at p. 180. 
35 R. v. Kennedy (1995) 103 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (Nfld.C.A.) at p.184, see also R. v. 
Manninen [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233 (S.C.C.), R. v. Young (1987) 38 C.C.C. 452 (N.B.C.A.) 
per Ryan J.A. 
36 R. v. Jackson (1993) 86 C.C.C. (3d) 233 (Ont.C.A.) at p.240. 
37 R. v. Standish (1988) 41 C.C.C. (3d) 340 (B.C.C.A.) at p.343. 
38 See also R. v. Rees [1986] B.C.J. No. 1730 (B.C.S.C.), R. v. Playford (1987) 40 
C.C.C. (3d) 142 (Ont.C.A.) at p.158, R. v. McKane (1987) 35 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont.C.A.) 
at p.481. 
39 R. v. Miller (1990) 25 M.V.R. (2d) 170 (Nfld.C.A.). 
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 person who believes that their conversation will be 
overheard by the police will be substantially prejudiced 
in making use of their right to counsel unless it can be 
shown that the person was in fact able to retain and 
instruct counsel in private. Proof that the person could 
have consulted in private only by whispering or by some 
other unusual device does not meet the test of 
privacy40. Privacy ensures full and frank disclosure 
between the person and their lawyer and permits 
proper legal advice and assistance being rendered41.  
 
Providing the person with access to a telephone room in 
the police detention area may satisfy this right of 
privacy. Often these rooms have a door which closes 
and a viewing window to maintain a "watch" over the 
person for security reasons. This type of telephone 
facility will ensure complete confidentiality of 
communication with counsel without compromising the 
security and integrity of the investigation.  
 
Circumstances will arise where a telephone is 
immediately available, such as at an arrestee's home or 
a cellular telephone is available at the roadside of an 
impaired driving arrest.  Although the phrase "without 
delay" in the text of s.10(b) connotes immediacy, there 
will be occasions where the police will have the 
discretion to defer access to counsel to a police 
controlled environment to ensure privacy.  Frequently, 
threats to officer safety are objectively unpredictable 
and the destruction of evidence and escape are far 
from speculative risks when a person is left 
unsupervised in a non-police facility when exercising 
their right to counsel in private42. Police officers who 
make an arrest in potentially volatile situations may be 
justified in denying the right to immediately make a 
telephone call in order to prevent new factors from 
entering the situation43. Where however, there is a 
telephone at the place of arrest and there is no other 
reason (eg. security considerations, privacy, integrity 
of the investigation) which justifies delay, the police 
should let the person use the telephone44.  
 
If the police delay contact with counsel to facilitate 
privacy in a controlled environment, the implementation 
obligation requiring the police to refrain from eliciting 
evidence continues until access to counsel in private is 
granted45. 
                                                 
                                                
40 R. v. Playford (1987) 40 C.C.C. (3d) 142 (Ont.C.A.). 
41 R. v. Rees [1986] B.C.J. No. 1730 (B.C.S.C.). 
42 R. v. Van Wyk [1999] O.J. No.3515 (Ont.S.C.J.).  
43 R. v. Taylor (1990) 54 C.C.C. (3d) 152 (N.S.C.A.) . 
44 R. v. Gyori (1994) 19 C.R.R. (2d) 331 (Alta.C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 
[1994] 1 S.C.R. vii. 
 
Reasonable Diligence and Right to Counsel  
 
A person who seeks to exercise their right to counsel 
must do so with reasonable diligence46. Just as there is 
an obligation imposed on the police to provide a person 
with a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel, there 
is corresponding obligation on the person to exercise 
reasonable diligence in exercising their right. The 
immediate need for legal advice may often be 
addressed by the police officer's obligation to inform 
the person of the availability of duty counsel and Legal 
Aid. The existence of duty counsel services may affect 
the determination of "reasonable diligence", which in 
turn may affect the length of time during which the 
police cease eliciting evidence47.  
 
Occasions may arise where it appears a person is taking 
an unreasonably long period of time to contact counsel 
and may even appear the person is feigning attempts to 
contact counsel. This type of behaviour may arise in 
impaired driving investigations where the person may 
make efforts to delay the taking of breath samples 
(stalling tactic) in hopes that their blood/alcohol 
readings will decrease over time. If the person is not 
reasonably diligent in exercising their right to counsel, 
the correlative duties of providing a reasonable 
opportunity and holding off in eliciting incriminating 
evidence are suspended48. In R. v. Smith [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
368 (S.C.C.), the police provided the accused with a 
telephone book and telephone to contact his counsel. 
The accused decided not to call because it was 9:00 
p.m. and the only telephone number appearing in the 
book was for his lawyer's office number. Police 
suggested the accused attempt to call his lawyer since 
it was possible that somebody would be at the office or 
an answering machine would indicate a second telephone 
number where the lawyer could be contacted. The 
accused refused and decided to wait until morning.  
Lamer J. found the police were justified in continuing 
their questioning in obtaining a statement because the 
accused was not reasonably diligent in the exercise of 
his rights.  
 
 
 
45 R. v. Gilbert (1988) 40 C.C.C. (3d) 423 (Ont.C.A.) at p.428, R. v. Gyori (1994) 19 
C.R.R. (2d) 331 (Alta.C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1994] 1 S.C.R. vii. 
46 R. v. Dunnett (1990) 62 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (N.B.C.A.) at p.23, R. v. Luong (2000) 149 
C.C.C. (3d) 571 (Alta.C.A.) at p. 575. 
47 R. v. Prosper [1994] 3 S..R. 236 (S.C.C.). 
48 R. v. Ross [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), R. v. Tremblay [1987] 2 S.C.R. 435 (S.C.C.), R. 
v. Smith [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368 (S.C.C.) per Lamer J. 
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 Right to Counsel of Choice 
 
Section 10(b) entitles 
an arrested or 
detained person the 
right to consult with a 
lawyer of their 
choice49. If however, 
necessitates an unreason
detained person has an 
lawyer50. Reasonable dilige
choose one's counsel de
which the person finds th
immediate legal advice, no
lawyer to conduct a trial
counsel imposed under s
corresponding obligation
diligence.   
 
As a consequence of hav
choice, the person may co
to obtain that legal advi
cost of the long distance 
to counsel is dependent o
call (calling collect) or if 
charge to their own num
diligently exercised the
awaiting a return call from
case where answering se
evening hours), the polic
return call go through to t
 
Obtaining Counsel Thro
 
A 
som
con
cou
to 
see
req
is not a waiver of the righ
circumstances where the
retain and instruct couns
through an intermediary
person does not specific
lawyer but does reques
determine whether she has been successful in 
contacting a lawyer, he is asserting a desire to 
exercise his right to counsel and the necessary 
                                     
49 R. v. Ross [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) 
50 R. v. Black [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138 (S.C.C.
51 R. v. David [1990] B.C.J. No. 1242 (B.
52 R. v. LaPlante (1987) 40 C.C.C. (3d) 6
53 R. v. Tremblay [1987] 2 S.C.R. 435 at
54 R. v. Crossman [1991] B.C.J. No. 729 
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able delay, the arrested or 
obligation to accept another 
nce in exercising the right to 
pends upon the context in 
emselves. It is the need for 
t the need to seek the best 
, that underlies the right to 
.10 of the Charter and the 
 to exercise reasonable 
ing the right to counsel of 
ntact a long distance number 
ce. The police must pay the 
billing if exercising the right 
n a third party accepting the 
the person has an inability to 
ber51. Where a person has 
ir right to counsel and is 
 their lawyer (such as is the 
rvices take calls during late 
e are obligated to let the 
he person in police custody.  
 
ugh an Intermediary 
person who requests to call 
eone, other than a lawyer in 
arrangements to enable the accused to call his wife for 
the purpose of retaining counsel must be afforded55. 
Any questioning commencing after a person asserts 
their right, but before a reasonable opportunity is 
afforded, will result in a Charter violation.  
 
Dissuasion 
 
The police must not attempt to dissuade a person from 
attempting to exercise their right to counsel56. Section 
10(b) of the Charter prohibits the police from 
belittling a person's lawyer with the express goal of 
undermining the person's confidence in, and 
relationship with, counsel. Police will violate a person's 
s.10 right to counsel if they are able to57: 
 
• undermine the person's confidence in their lawyer, 
such as denigrating the integrity of the lawyer or 
making disparaging comments concerning the lawyer's 
loyalty, availability, or legal fees, or  
 
• undermine the person's relationship (solicitor-client) 
with their counsel. 
 
Offering Deals 
 
If the police offer a plea 
bargain or "deal", such as 
charging with second degree 
murder instead of first degree 
murder in exchange for a 
statement, this deal must be 
offered either to the person's counsel or to the person  
nection with instructing 
nsel, is asserting the desire 
exercise their right52; 
king contact with counsel by 
uesting to call a third party 
t to counsel53. There may be 
 only course of action to 
el and obtain advice will be 
54. For example, where a 
ally request to speak to a 
t to speak to his wife to 
            
                                                ), R. v. Ross [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) 
C.Co.Ct.) 
3 (Sask.C.A.) per Vancise J.A. at p.74. 
 para.8. 
(B.C.C.A.) 
in the presence of their counsel unless the person has 
expressly waived their right to counsel. A s.10(b) 
breach will occur when the police coercively offer a 
person a deal for a limited time only knowing that the 
person's counsel of choice is unavailable58. 
 
Change of Mind After Asserting Rights 
 
Occasions may arise where a 
person has asserted their 
right to counsel and has been 
reasonably diligent in 
exercising their right but 
indicates that they have 
 
55 R. v. LaPlante (1987) 40 C.C.C. (3d) 63 (Sask.C.A.) 
56 R. v. Smith (1999) Docket:C23659, C31758 (Ont.C.A.). 
57 R. v. Burlingham [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.) per Iacobucci. 
58 R. v. Burlingham [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.) per Iacobucci. 
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 changed their mind and no longer want legal advice. In 
these circumstances, the police are obligated to inform 
the person of their right to a reasonable opportunity 
to contact counsel and the police obligation in holding 
off from obtaining incriminating evidence, whether by 
statement or participating in any process59. This 
additional informational requirement ensures that the 
person has given a free and voluntary informed waiver 
of their right to counsel60.  
 
Delay in Providing Opportunity of Right to 
Counsel 
 
There may be cases of urgency where the police need 
not provide a reasonable opportunity to contact 
counsel61. Circumstances will occur where there is a 
necessity to bring a potentially volatile situation under 
control.  The presence of unknown persons or weapons 
in a home while police are executing a search warrant is 
one example. The police will be justified in delaying 
providing an opportunity to contact counsel when the 
police are preventing any new factors from entering a 
situation until the unknowns are clarified. Once the 
police are clearly in control of a situation a reasonable 
opportunity must now be provided62. "Urgency" in this 
context does not refer to investigatory or evidentiary 
expediency; mere expediency or efficiency of an 
investigation is not sufficient to create enough urgency 
to permit a s.10(b) breach63.  Such a delay is only 
appropriate until such time as matters are under 
control.  After which, access to counsel must then be 
provided.   
 
In search cases the police, as a general rule, are not 
obligated to suspend a search and provide a person the 
opportunity to retain and instruct counsel. Although a 
person has the right to be informed of the right to 
retain and instruct counsel upon arrest or detention, 
police who seek to search a person incident to arrest 
are not required to suspend the search until the person 
has had an opportunity to contact counsel. However, 
where a search is dependent upon a detained persons 
choice to participate in a process, such as a consent 
search, the person must have been afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise their right to 
counsel64. 
                                                 
59 R. v. Prosper (1994) 92 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (S.C.C.) at p.378-379, R. v. Luong (2000) 
149 C.C.C. (3d) 571 (Alta.C.A.) at p.576. 
60 R. v. Smith (1999) Docket:C23659, C31758 (Ont.C.A.). 
 
61 R. v. Manninen [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233 (S.C.C.), see also R. v. Gilbert (1988) 40 C.C.C. 
(3d) 423 (Ont.C.A.) at p.429. 
62 R. v. Strachan (1988) 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.) 
63 R. v. Burlingham [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.) per Iacobucci J. 
 
Continued Questioning Following Access to 
Counsel 
 
The police are entitled to question a person who has 
chosen to exercise their right to counsel provided the 
person has had a reasonable opportunity to retain and 
instruct counsel65. Once a person has consulted counsel 
in full measure, the duty imposed on the police to cease 
questioning is removed and the police are entitled to 
elicit evidence from the person66.  Furthermore, police 
are not prevented from questioning the person without 
first receiving permission from counsel or without 
counsel being present even though the police are aware 
the person has been advised by their counsel not to say 
anything67. To this end, police are entitled to pursue 
legitimate means of persuasion to encourage persons to 
speak in the absence of counsel provided the person is 
in a position to make an informed choice by having had 
the opportunity to consult counsel68. In R. v. Ekman 
2000 BCCA 414 appeal to S.C.C. refused, Newbury J. 
concluded the police obligation as follows: 
 
In summary, whilst an accused has the right to counsel 
and the right to remain silent in response to questioning 
by the state, he or she does not have an absolute right, 
after consulting counsel, to be free from police 
questioning. Conversely, the police are not bound to 
refrain from interviewing a suspect (again within 
reasonable limits), nor bound to advise counsel they 
intend to question the detainee. (emphasis added) 
 
Similarly, there is no duty on the part of the police to 
prevent a person, who had been advised of their 
Charter rights, from making a voluntary statement 
unless there was some indication that the earlier 
Charter warning had not been understood or that the 
person had changed their mind and now wanted to 
speak to a lawyer69. An adult person70 does not have 
the right to the presence of their lawyer at a police 
interview71. The police are free to question a person in 
absence of counsel as long as the person has been 
afforded the informational (right to counsel and 
                                                 
64 R. v. Debot  [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 (S.C.C.) per Lamer J. 
65 R. v. Playford (1987) 40 C.C.C. (3d) 142 (Ont.C.A.) at p.168. 
66 R. v. Ekman 2000 BCCA 414 at para. 22, see also R. v. Hebert [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 
(S.C.C.) per McLachlin J., see also R. v. J.T.J (No.2) (1988) 40 C.C.C. (3d) 97 
(Man.C.A.) per Huband J.A., R. v. Cuff (1989) 49 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (Nfld. C.A. ) at p. 
72-73. 
67 R. v. Emile (1988) 42 C.C.C. (3d) 408 (N.W.T.C.A.) at p.430. 
68 R. v. M.C. [1998] B.C.J. No.1582 (B.C.S.C.) at para.53. 
69 R. v Gray (1993) 81 C.C.C. (3d) 174 (Man.C.A.) per Scott C.A. at p.185. 
70 See s.56(2) of the Young Offenders Act in cases of young persons.  
71 R. v. Mayo (1999) 133 C.C.C. (3d) 168 (Ont.C.A.). 
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 availability of Legal Aid and duty counsel) and 
implementational (reasonable opportunity and holding 
off) components72. A person does however, have the 
right to remain silent and may therefore impose or 
insist on having their lawyer present as a precondition 
to waiving their right to silence.  
 
Similarly, a lawyer cannot insist on being present when 
the police question a person who has obtained counsel. 
Detained persons themselves must decide whether to 
speak to the police on their own or not at all73. The 
police are permitted to use appropriate perseverance in 
questioning a person, provided the questions are non-
coercive or oppressive. Questioning which commences 
as a legitimate form of persuasion may, because of the 
degree of emotional or psychological pressure brought 
to bear, render the statement involuntary and thus 
inadmissible74. 
 
Once the right to counsel has been exercised, 
different considerations apply to the granting of 
subsequent access to counsel than before counsel had 
been consulted. The pressing need to cease questioning 
until counsel's advice has been obtained no longer 
exists. Although the right to counsel must be 
"reactivated" in certain circumstances, once the 
obligation of the police has been met the police may 
attempt to elicit evidence75. For example, the police 
are not required to defer their investigation of a 
person arrested in Alberta for offences in Ontario 
when the person expresses a desire to talk to 
particular legal counsel when he is escorted back to 
Ontario by police76.  
 
Limitation of Right to Counsel  
 
Motorists 
 
 
Stopping of a motorist by 
the police related to 
traffic control 
enforcement (ie. speeding, 
the inspection of 
documents, mechanical 
condition, detection of 
impaired drivers), although a detention for the 
purposes of the Charter, does not require that the 
motorist be advised of their Charter rights under s.10. 
This suspension of the right to counsel is a reasonable 
limit under s.1 of the Charter. 
                                                 
                                                72 R. v. Gormley (1999) Docket:AD-0680 (P.E.I.C.A.) at para.42. 
73 R. v. Ekman 2000 BCCA 414. 
74 R. v. Ballantyne (1997) Docket:10929 (B.C.S.C.) at para.28. 
75 See for example R. v. Ballantyne 1997 Docket:10929 B.C.S.C. at para.24. 
76 R. v. Wells (2001) Docket:C13744 (Ont.C.A.) 
 
Roadside Screening Device Demand 
 
A person who is requested to submit to an immediate 
breath sample by means of an approved screening 
device at the roadside under s.254(2) of the Criminal 
Code is not required to be advised of their right to 
counsel under s.10 of the Charter. Provided the focus 
of the stop is restricted to highway safety and 
compliance with the demand, the suspension of the 
right to counsel is a reasonable limit under s.1 of the 
Charter. This is even the case where a person has 
ready access to a cellular telephone. The existence or 
non-existence of a constitutional right cannot vary on 
the basis of how far a person is from a telephone at 
the time the demand is made77.  
 
Sobriety Tests 
 
When requesting the performance of sobriety tests, 
the police need not inform the suspected impaired 
driver of their right to counsel if the purpose is to 
assess suspicion and thus permit the officer’s 
formulation of reasonable grounds of impairment. 
However, the results of the sobriety tests are only 
admissible for the purpose of establishing the 
officer's reasonable grounds for the breath demand 
and are not admissible for the purpose of incriminating 
the person at trial. However, once the police form 
reasonable grounds for the demand, there is nothing 
which prevents the police from providing the person 
with their s.10(b) rights and then repeating the tests 
for the purposes of obtaining court admissible 
incriminating evidence78 (provided the driver waives 
this right).  
 
Summary 
 
The police obligation imposed by s.10(b)79 includes: 
 
¾ Clearly and properly informing the person by a 
method of communication and in terms the person 
can understand at a time they are capable of 
understanding or comprehending they have the 
right to retain and instruct (obtain) counsel 
without delay and of the existence and availability 
of Legal Aid and duty counsel. If there are special 
circumstances which suggest a lack of 
 
77 R. v. Sadlon (1992) 36 M.V.R. (2d) 127 (Ont.C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 
[1992] 3 S.C.R. viii., see also R. v. Smith (1996) 105 C.C.C. (3d) 58 (Ont.C.A.). 
78 R. v. Barlow 1996 Docket:8141 B.C.S.C. 
79 See for example R. v. Luong (2000) 149 C.C.C. (3d) 571 (Alta.C.A.) at p.574-575. 
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 understanding such as shock, drunkenness, or 
mental deficiency, the police officer must go 
further in explaining the right 
 
¾ If the person chooses to exercise their right to 
counsel the police must 
 
• Provide the person the opportunity to exercise 
the right without delay (This may require 
assisting the person in their efforts to obtain a 
lawyer and includes ensuring privacy). 
 
• Stop eliciting evidence prior to affording them 
the reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct 
counsel. If the person is not diligent, this 
"holding off" obligation is waived 
 
The Crown has the burden of establishing that the 
person who invoked their right to counsel was provided 
with a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel.  The 
person has the burden of establishing that they were 
reasonably diligent in the exercise of their right. If 
the person was not reasonably diligent then the 
implementational duties of s.10(b) do not arise or will 
be suspended80 and the police may continue with their 
investigation. 
 
DID YOU KNOW…? 
 
…in 2000 the average time between the filing of an 
application for an appeal before the Supreme Court of 
Canada and the decision on whether the appeal will be 
heard is 5.4 months. From the time of the decision to 
the time of the hearing takes another 12.5 months. 
Finally, on average an additional 5.8 months will elapse 
between the hearing and the judgment of the Court. In 
short, it takes 23.7 months, or 10 days short of 2 years, 
for a case to make it through the Supreme Court. 
Remember this the next time you need to make that 
decision in a moments notice without a second opinion, 
judicial review, or appellate process!!!81 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“In the APEC and Hyatt matters, the police directly 
interfered [with the protests] and have been roundly 
criticized for doing so. In truth, the police will be 
damned if they do act and damned if they don’t82.” 
BCCA Justice Southin. 
                                                 
80 R. v. Luong (2000) 149 C.C.C. (3d) 571 (Alta.C.A.) at p.575. 
81 Source: the Supreme Court of Canada’s Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition 
available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/index_e.html 
82 R. v. Clark 2001 BCCA 706 
 
CLASS 85 GRADUATES 
 
The Police Academy is pleased to announce the 
successful graduation of recruit Class 85 as qualified 
municipal constables on February 8, 2002. 
 
ABBOTSFORD 
Cst. Jodi Christie 
Cst. James Gerrits 
Cst. Ryan Reed 
Cst. Gary Reid 
Cst. Linley Steeves 
 
DELTA  
Cst. Craig Burridge 
Cst. Gwyneth Nichols 
Cst. Richard Peeler 
 
SAANICH 
Cst. Marco Berton 
Cst. Heather O’Connor 
 
STL’ATL’IMX 
Cst. Cheryl Simpkin 
 
 
 
VANCOUVER 
Cst. Mark Bradshaw 
Cst. Richard Coulthard 
Cst. Shaun Deans 
Cst. Jocelyn Deziel 
Cst. John Fillippelli 
Cst. Anna Grigoletto 
Cst. Gabriel Kojima 
Cst. Lene MacKay 
Cst. Darin McDougall 
Cst. David Moe 
Cst. Daniel Murphy 
Cst. Ana Oproescu 
Cst. Dale Quiring 
Cst. Conrad Van Dyk 
 
VICTORIA 
Cst. Sergei Babakaiff 
 
WEST VANCOUVER 
Cst. Lisa Alford 
 
Congratulations to Cst. Shaun Deans 
Volume 2 Issue 2 
February 2002 (Vancouver), who was the recipient of 
the British Columbia Association of 
Chiefs of Police Shield of Merit for best 
all around recruit performance in basic 
training. Cst. Dale Quiring (Vancouver) 
received the Abbotsford Police Association Oliver 
Thomson Trophy for outstanding physical fitness. Cst. 
Richard Coulthard (Vancouver) was the recipient of the 
Vancouver Police Union Excellence in Academics award 
for best academic test results in all disciplines. Cst. 
James Gerrits (Abbotsford) received the British 
Columbia Federation of Police Officers Valedictorian 
award for being selected by his peers to represent his 
class at the graduation ceremony. Cst. Richard Coulthard 
(Vancouver) was the recipient of the Abbotsford Police 
Recruit Marksmanship award for highest qualification 
score during Block 3 training (50/50). 
 
11
 ASSAULT CBH: INCLUDED 
OFFENCE OF AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT 
R. v. Soluk, 2001 BCCA 519 
 
The accused appealed his conviction 
The accused appealed her convictions arguing “she 
should not be convicted of the living off the avails 
offence because her relationship with the escorts was 
supportive rather than exploitive”; there was no proof 
of the required element of a parasitic relationship. The 
accused submitted “she provided services that allowed 
the women to remain off the streets in relative safety. 
No escort was forced to take a particular job, nor of assault causing bodily harm after 
he was charged with aggravated 
assault when he threw ammonia in 
the victim’s face. The accused 
argued that he could not be convicted of assault 
causing bodily harm as an included offence within an 
unparticularized charge of aggravated assault. Under 
s.662 of the Criminal Code, an offence may be included 
in the other if it is described in the enactment 
creating it or if it is included in the offence as charged 
in the count. Because the wording of the charge did not 
explicitly reference “bodily harm”, the issue on appeal 
was whether assault causing bodily harm is included in 
the offence of aggravated assault in the enactment 
creating it. The British Columbia Court of Appeal held 
that assault causing bodily harm is included in 3 of the 
4 ways (wounding, maiming, or disfiguring) in which an 
aggravated assault may be committed and dismissed 
the appeal. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
LIVING OFF THE AVAILS: 
PARASITISM DOES NOT 
REQUIRE COERCION 
R. v. Barrow, 
(2001) Docket:C30789 (OntCA) 
 
The accused ran an escort agency and 
arranged dates between male clients 
perform any particular act, including sexual acts. She 
provided advice and, in some cases, friendship”.  
 
In holding that the accused was properly convicted, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal found the element of 
parasitism was established by “the fact that she is in 
the business of rendering services to the escorts 
because they are prostitutes”. Furthermore, the Court 
rejected the accused’s policy argument that the escort 
agency relationship should not fall within the offence 
of living off the avails unless there was some element 
of coercion or control.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
SAFETY SEARCH 
UNREASONABLE: POLICE 
EXCEED SCOPE 
R. v. Shatford, 2001 NBPC 9 
 
Police responded to a fight in front 
of a nightclub where an upset female 
who had been drinking approached 
and, while pointing in the direction of 
two people in the parking lot, alleged 
that “those fellows just threw a knife at me and my 
boyfriend”. As one of the two officers responding 
approached the two people he observed they were 
arguing; a male was backing away from an angry female 
who said “he’s one of them too”. With only these two who called the agency and the female 
escorts she employed. The accused kept 
1/3 of the fee that ranged between 
$150-$180. Although the accused did not coerce the 
escorts and was supportive of them, she was aware 
that the escorts would on occasion engage in sexual 
activity and counseled them on how to deal with such 
requests and what precautions to take. The accused 
was convicted of several prostitution related offences, 
including three counts of living off the avails, on the 
evidence of two female undercover police officers 
posing as potential employees and four of the escorts. 
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February 2002 tatements the officer placed his hand on the accused, 
ook him by the arm to the police car, and ordered him 
o put his hands on the car. After asking “why”, the 
fficer informed the accused he had just thrown a knife 
nto a crowd and that he was still investigating the 
omplaint. After being granted permission to put some 
oney in his pocket, the officer commanded the accused 
o place his hands on the hood of the car. The accused 
id not comply and after observing the accused 
idgeting in his pockets, the accused was placed in an 
rm bar and was handcuffed. The accused was pat 
risked and 12 rocks of cocaine were found in his pocket. 
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 In summarizing the law regarding investigative 
detentions, the provincial court judge stated: 
The common law principle authorizing searches incidental 
to arrest has been extended to persons lawfully detained 
for investigations. The power to detain for investigative 
purpose exists under common law. The standard imposed 
for authorizing detention for investigative purposes is 
one of reasonable suspicion based on an articulable cause 
which means the officer must establish "...a constellation 
of objectively discernable facts which give the detaining 
officer reasonable cause to suspect the detainee is ..." 
involved in the activity under investigation.  
The power to conduct searches incidental to lawful 
arrest or detention is not limitless and must not be 
conducted in an abusive fashion. Cursory searches such as 
"frisk" or "pat down" searches for weapons undertaken 
for the purpose of officer safety and carried out in an 
inoffensive manner have been found to be minimally 
intrusive to the detainee and therefore reasonable in the 
circumstances.   
Courts have been mindful of the difficult and often 
dangerous and urgent circumstances under which police 
officers must exercise their discretion as to articulable 
cause detentions and incidental searches.  Courts have 
allowed the police latitude and grounds to conduct 
investigations in safety.    
However, although a peace officer having articulable 
cause may briefly detain a person to investigate him, the 
officer may not search the person for contraband in the 
absence of reasonable and probable grounds to arrest 
the person for possession of the contraband.  
In summary, a police officer, if he or she has articulable 
cause, may detain a person for investigative purposes.  In 
order to protect him or herself during the course of the 
detention, the officer may conduct a search of the 
detainee.  The permitted scope of the search will depend 
upon the circumstances facing the officer. (references 
omitted) 
Three reasons were advanced by the Crown to justify 
the police action of securing the accused in an arm bar 
and handcuffing him: 
 
• failure to comply with the command to put his hands 
on the car, 
• hand fidgeting in his pockets, and 
• officer safety 
 
The trial judge found that if the officer was really 
concerned about his safety he would not have initially 
allowed the accused to put his hands in his pockets. To 
this end, “the failure to obey a command and the hand 
fidgeting were really induced by the officer in the first 
place”. A second officer testified that the conduct could 
also indicate the presence of contraband. The Provincial 
Court judge held: 
In my opinion, the police officer shifted his principal 
focus from a weapons investigation to suspicion the 
accused had contraband and that is probably the 
underlying reason that he then commanded the accused 
to place his hand on the hood and then placed him in an 
arm bar and handcuffs when the accused did not 
immediately comply.  
And further: 
[T]here were no visual signs indicating the  presence of a 
weapon on the accused, such as a bulge or protruding 
object for which s, 117.02 [of the Criminal Code] would 
allow a search for a weapon.  There was no reasonable 
prospect apparent of securing evidence of the offence 
for which the accused was being detained.  
Did the circumstances then give the police the right to 
search the accused?  In my opinion, they did not. In the 
absence of officer's safety concerns there can not be an 
argument that a search of his person for contraband is 
warranted as ancillary to investigative detention on an 
unrelated matter.  Further there is no other basis which 
would justify the warrantless search.  
Having found a breach of the accused’s s.8 right, the 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter. 
 
POLICE NEGLIGENT BUT NO 
CAUSATION:  
ACTION DISMISSED     
Mooney et al. v. Attorney General et al., 
2001 BCSC 419 
 
The plaintiff brought an action 
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February 2002 against the Attorney Generals of 
Canada and British Columbia and a 
named RCMP officer alleging that the 
officer was negligent in failing to 
nvestigate the threatening behaviour of her common-
aw husband (Kruska) and that reasonable steps were not 
aken to protect her family.  On November 5th, 1995 the 
laintiff and her common-law husband separated 
ollowing a brutal assault; the plaintiff was struck on the 
high and head with a walking stick after she had been 
hoked into unconsciousness. This was the fourth time 
he had been assaulted by her common-law. Kruska was 
rrested and charged with assault with a weapon and 
ause bodily harm, but the plaintiff subsequently 
rovided a second statement to police claiming she 
tarted the incident, did not want to proceed with 
13
 charges, and that the whole issue was “bullshit”. This 
occurred after Kruska threatened suicide if he received 
a long prison sentence and after he had promised the 
plaintiff he would convey his property interest in their 
home to the plaintiff. Although Crown did not believe 
the plaintiff, a plea bargain was struck whereby Kruska 
pled guilty to ordinary assault and was sentenced to 21 
days in jail and received a one-year probation order. 
Kruska had a criminal record for drug trafficking, 
manslaughter, and sexual assault. 
 
Kruska had moved to live with his parents in Prince 
George and on March 11, 1996 called the plaintiff asking 
her to meet him to discuss the transfer of the home. 
They initially met in a restaurant, but then drove to a 
park. The plaintiff became concerned about Kruska’s 
increased agitation during their conversation in his car 
so she exited his vehicle, entered her own and left (even 
though Kruska attempted to prevent her) with Kruska 
chasing her in his car. The plaintiff circled a friend’s 
home honking her horn to get the friend’s attention; this 
apparently discouraged Kruska’s pursuit. The plaintiff 
attended the Prince George RCMP detachment to report 
Kruska’s threatening behaviour. The investigating 
officer examined the plaintiff’s written statement, 
questioned her briefly, obtained a copy of Kruska’s 
criminal record, and took the documents to the watch 
commander. The watch commander agreed with the 
investigating officer that there were insufficient 
grounds to recommend a complaint under s.810 of the 
Criminal Code (peace bond application) and the plaintiff 
was recommended to speak with a lawyer about obtaining 
a restraining order.  
 
On the morning of June 16, 1996, the plaintiff argued 
with Kruska on the phone (no threats were made) and 
the police were not called. Later that evening, Kruska 
attended the home of the plaintiff, smashed the sliding 
glass door with the butt of his shotgun, and entered the 
house. A friend of the plaintiff’s, who had confronted 
Kruska, was shot dead, the plaintiff’s 12-year-old 
daughter Michelle was shot in the shoulder. The plaintiff 
escaped through the bathroom window. Michelle was 
able to boost her sister through the same bathroom 
window and the two girls ran in opposite directions. 
Kruska set the home on fire then killed himself.  
 
The plaintiff sued, alleging the RCMP officer 
investigating the previous threatening behaviour owed 
her a duty of care and was negligent for failing to: 
 
• adequately inform himself of Kruska’s background and 
propensity for violence; 
• conduct an adequate investigation of the background 
circumstances and the complaints of violence and 
threats against the plaintiff; 
• respond in a timely and adequate manner to the 
complaints of the plaintiff; and 
• take reasonable steps in all the circumstances to 
ensure the safety and security of the plaintiff and 
her family after March 11, 1996. 
 
To succeed in an action of this nature, a plaintiff must 
prove on the civil standard the following: 
 
• the defendants (police) owed her a duty of care;  
• the defendants (police) breached the duty of care 
(were negligent); and 
• the negligence materially contributed to the harm 
caused; the damages flowed from the breach.  
 
Before addressing the duty of care, the Court examined 
s. 21(1) of the Police Act which exempts police officers, 
in the absence of a finding of gross negligence, from 
actions for damages arising out of the performance of 
their duties. Even if the officer was negligent in this 
case, but not grossly negligent, he is protected under 
this section from personal liability. However, s. 11(1) of 
the Police Act imposes vicarious liability on the Province 
of British Columbia upon a finding of negligence.   
 
Duty of Care 
 
In finding that the police owed the plaintiff a duty of 
care, the trial judge concluded that the officer was 
negligent (although not grossly negligent) in his actions 
for failing to properly commence an investigation.  The 
officer was well aware of current policies concerning 
domestic violence and an internal investigation 
determined the officer’s handling of the complaint failed 
to meet investigative standards.  
 
Causation 
 
In assessing whether the action’s of the officer, or his 
nonfeasance, materially contributed to the shootings, 
the court found “no clear connection between [the 
officer’s] failure to act…and…Kruska’s fateful 
trip…seven weeks later. The officer’s inaction did not 
materially increase the risk of harm to the extent that 
[the officer] must bear responsibility for Kruska’ acts”. 
 
Although the officer owed the plaintiff and her family a 
greater duty of care than was demonstrated, causation 
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 was not established and the claim for damages was 
dismissed. 
 
Editor’s Note: In anticipation of an appeal, the judge 
released supplementary reasons for judgment (reported 
at 2001 BCSC 1079). Had causation been proven, the 
Court would have awarded damages as follows: 
 
• plaintiff’s daughter who was shot 
• pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment=$150,000 
• future care=$25,000 
• loss of future income=$100,000 
• plaintiff’s uninjured daughter 
• non-pecuniary damages=$15,000 
• plaintiff 
• non-pecuniary damages=$75,000 
• past income loss=$90,000 (no award for future 
income loss) 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
FORCE USED DURING IMPAIRED 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
JUSTIFIED 
Parker v. Vancouver, 2001 BCSC 1784 
A Supreme Court judge dismissed a 
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arm's length of the plaintiff the officer reached and 
touched him. The plaintiff muttered "get your hands 
off." The officer asked the plaintiff if he had seen the 
police vehicle but there was no response. The plaintiff 
was getting more agitated and the constable told him 
he was under investigation for impaired driving. The 
plaintiff’s agitation increased and he took a "fighter 
stance" which, along with the look in his eyes and the 
tension in his jaw, led the officer to recognize that he 
anticipated resistance. 
The officer ordered the plaintiff to put his hands 
behind his back. With the assistance of the motorist, 
the plaintiff was handcuffed. The plaintiff’s "walking" 
could not be controlled so the officer placed him on 
the ground using a leg sweep. The plaintiff was held in 
this position and after two minutes settled down. 
The female passenger, who had returned from the 
house, was hysterical and demanded to know what the 
officer was doing; she said she would call her lawyer. 
The female was ranting and pointing and poking at the 
officer’s chest. She gave the officer no opportunity to 
reply to her questions and he told her to get back but 
it "fell on deaf ears." The officer physically moved the 
female; her response was to charge, swinging and 
flailing her arms. The officer grabbed her by the neck 
and pushed her back to the garage. He then put her 
V
Fclaim for damages as a result of 
injuries suffered during an alleged 
unlawful detention and assault by 
members of the Vancouver Police 
epartment. A motorist, who had observed a vehicle 
riving erratically, running stop signs and red lights, 
nd driving all over the road, called 911 to report the 
ncident. By chance, the motorist spoke to a police 
fficer he noticed nearby and pointed to the suspect 
ehicle. The officer closed the distance and activated 
he police emergency lights but the vehicle did not 
top. The vehicle continued and turned down a lane 
fter making several turns. The officer thought the 
ehicle was trying to evade him or the driver was going 
o dump the vehicle.  
he vehicle stopped behind a garage and the female 
assenger immediately jumped out and went towards a 
ouse. The officer testified that he stopped about two 
ar lengths behind the plaintiff’s vehicle, exited as did 
he plaintiff, and called to the plaintiff who made a 
urn "as though he was going to go south." The officer 
aid "police" and told the plaintiff to "hold on." This 
ad "no effect" and when the officer came within an 
over the hood of the motor vehicle with one arm behind 
her back. She continued to struggle and tried to kick 
the officer in the groin. When other officers arrived 
she was handcuffed. When the officer received 
information about an outstanding probation order he 
decided to arrest the plaintiff for breach of probation. 
In dismissing the suit, Justice Thackray stated in his 
conclusion at para. 58-62:  
Section 73 of the Motor Vehicle Act, … , … , provides 
that a peace officer may require the driver of a vehicle 
to stop and that a driver when signalled to stop by an 
officer must immediately come to a safe stop. 
[The plaintiff] was so signalled and failed to obey. 
Section 25 of the Criminal Code, … , provides that every 
peace officer is, if he acts on reasonable grounds, 
justified in doing what he is required to do and in using as 
much force as is necessary for that purpose. 
I am of the opinion that [the officer] was acting within 
his authority when he signalled [the plaintiff] to stop his 
motor vehicle. I am also of the opinion that in carrying 
out his duties to investigate [the plaintiff] for impaired 
olume 2 Issue 2 
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 driving he was authorized to use as much force as 
necessary. 
In carrying out those duties and responsibilities 
detention was the only course open to [the officer]. In 
effecting the detention [the officer] used no more force 
than necessary. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
CHANCE “CRANE” GAME 
ILLEGAL: CONVICTIONS 
UPHELD 
R. v. Balance Group International Trading Ltd., 
(2002) Docket:C34761 (OntCA) 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed 
an appeal from convictions resulting 
In our view, the amount of control exercised by the 
ordinary player was so minimal that the game operated as 
one of chance or at best mixed chance and skill.  The 
evidence established that the average player simply could 
not exercise sufficient skill to compensate for the other 
elements of the game that were wholly beyond the power 
of the player to influence.  The ability of the player to 
control the crane’s lateral movement gave the appearance 
of an element of skill.  In reality, however, as a matter of 
common sense the game would be played as a game of 
chance.  The expert evidence adduced by the Crown and 
accepted by the trial judge demonstrated that there were 
too many other variables that were far more important 
than the positioning of the crane that would overcome 
what little skill the operator might bring to the game.  
 
We agree with the [accused] that simply because a game 
has an increased level of difficulty does not necessarily 
mean the game will be viewed as one of chance or mixed 
skill and chance.  We also accept that merely because some 
elements of the game are out of the control of the player 
does not make the game one of mixed chance and skill. from the operation of two “crane 
games”. Following the seizure of two 
games from the accused premises, 
charges were laid under s. 206(1)(f) of the Criminal 
Code, which reads: 
 
s.206(1)(f) Criminal Code 
Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years who…disposes 
of any goods, wares or merchandise by any game of chance or 
any game of mixed chance and skill in which the contestant or 
competitor pays money or other valuable consideration… 
 
The trial judge described the games as follows (2000, 
O.J. No. 2771 (Ont.Crt.Jus.): 
 
The games became operational when a player deposited 
money into the machine.  Once this was done, the player 
could move a joystick.  This joystick directed an overhead 
crane to be positioned where the player wanted it. After 
the crane was positioned, the player depressed a red 
button on the joystick thereby causing a 3-tine claw to 
descend into a bin containing toys and novelties.  The claw 
then would close and the claw and prize (provided one had 
been secured) would ascend.  The claw would move to a 
position over a chute.  At this point, the claw opened 
thereby depositing the object into the chute.  The player 
could then take possession of the selected property.  It is 
to be noted that the player had no control over the 
machine once he had activated the red button on the 
joystick. 
 
In dismissing the accused’s appeal, a unanimous Ontario 
Court of Appeal held: 
 
Where, as in this case, however, virtually all of the 
elements of the game are out of the control of the player, 
it was open to the trial judge to conclude as he did that 
the game is one of mixed chance and skill.  As the trial 
judge said, as a matter of common sense the games are 
“games of mixed skill and chance with an overwhelming 
degree of chance and merely a dash of skill”. This was not 
a case where there were some unpredictable elements that 
might occasionally defeat the player’s skill, but the 
systematic resort to chance (references omitted):  
 
Editor’s Note: These types of games are not 
prohibited in all circumstances. For example, s.206(3) 
of the Code exempts s.206(1)(f) while the chance 
games are being operated at an annual fair or 
exhibition. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
TIP, SWAY, ODOUR, & 
BLOODSHOT EYES:REASONABLE 
GROUNDS SATISFIED  
R. v. Costello,  
(2002) Docket:C36444 (OntCA) 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal 
e
a
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February 2002 restored the conviction of an 
accused who earlier had his 
conviction overturned by the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice. In 
ntering an acquittal, the lower appeal court (reported 
t [2001] O.J. No. 2109 (Ont.S.C.J.)) found the trial 
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 judge had erred in finding that the officer had 
reasonable grounds to believe the accused’s ability to 
operate a motor vehicle was impaired. Although the trial 
judge “correctly outlined the legal test as being one of 
totality of the evidence objectively viewed”, it is the 
“whole package of evidence” which must be considered 
“and not just certain items that would support 
impairment”. In noting several factors that indicated a 
lack of impairment, which were not given sufficient 
weight, the appellate court judge found the trial judge 
had reached an unreasonable conclusion on the existence 
of reasonable grounds when viewed objectively. The 
factors noted by the summary convictions appeal court 
judge were listed as follows: 
 
• “there was no observation by the officer of erratic 
driving - in fact he observed reasonable driving; 
• “the officer noted no difficulties with the speech of 
the [accused]; 
• “[the accused] was cooperative: 
• “[the accused] responded immediately and 
appropriately in stopping his motor vehicle without 
difficulty, which is normal behaviour; 
• “[the accused] produced his correct documents such 
as driver's licence and insurance, without problems; 
• “the officer noted no difficulty with respect to the 
ability of the [accused] to walk, move or maintain his 
balance other than swaying when producing the 
ownership documents; 
• “the only observation with respect to his physical 
condition was bloodshot eyes as opposed to being 
glassy or with dilated pupils, as a result of which the 
observation of his physical condition was entirely 
equivocal; 
• “the existence of an odour of alcohol from the 
breath of the [accused] was consistent with 
consumption of some alcohol, however that's not 
enough to find reasonable and probable, grounds that 
he is unable to drive; 
• “[the accused] didn't personally interview the civilian 
complainants - they had just pointed; 
• “there were no details provided by the civilians at 
the restaurant as to the nature of their 
observations, which would enable either the officer 
or the learned trial Judge to evaluate the 
reasonableness or accuracy of such observations. 
 
In allowing the appeal and restoring the conviction a 
unanimous Court of Appeal found the appeal court judge 
who overturned the conviction should not have re-
weighed the evidence in determining whether reasonable 
grounds existed; the trial judge considered the relevant 
evidence and concluded the reasonable grounds standard 
had been met. Regarding factors indicating a lack of 
impairment listed by the appellate court judge, the 
unanimous Court of Appeal held: 
 
It was open to the trial judge to find that the officer had 
grounds to make the demand.  The absence of some 
factors that are sometimes found in an impaired driver  
did not undermine the finding of reasonable grounds based 
on the tip from the civilian, confirmed by the officer’s own 
observations that the respondent was swaying, had an 
odour of alcohol, and had bloodshot eyes. (emphasis added) 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
PAST POLICE PRACTICE 
PROVES FACT 
R. v. Thomson, 
(2001) Docket:C32509 (OntCA) 
 
The accused appealed his conviction 
of failing to comply with a demand to 
provide a breath sample. A police 
officer stopped the accused and 
after receiving an admission to the 
consumption of “one or two beers” and noting an odour of 
alcoholic beverage on his breath and red and bloodshot 
eyes, the officer made a demand for a roadside breath 
sample. Following three apparent attempts, the accused 
was arrested for failing to provide a sample. During the 
first attempt the officer did not hear the tone the 
device was supposed to make nor hear any air passing 
through the mouthpiece; during the second and third 
attempts air did enter the device but there was 
insufficient pressure to activate it. Among several 
grounds of appeal, it was argued the trial judge erred in 
finding that the officer checked for obstructions in the 
mouthpiece. The accused asserted that although the 
officer stated that it was her standard practice to 
check for obstructions in the mouthpiece, she had no 
specific memory of doing so and the judge should not 
have found that she did. In dismissing the appeal, the 
unanimous Court stated, at para. 9: 
 
If [the judge] accepted [the officer’s] evidence that it 
was her standard practice to check the mouthpiece and 
that she must have done so on the occasion in question, it 
was reasonably open to him to find, as he did, that she had 
checked it on the occasion in question.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
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 Note-able Quote 
 
“Every year, drunk driving leaves a terrible trail of 
death, injury, heartbreak and destruction.  From the 
point of view of numbers alone, it has a far greater 
impact on Canadian society than any other crime.  In 
terms of the deaths and serious injuries resulting in 
hospitalization, drunk driving is clearly the crime 
which causes the most significant social loss to the 
country.”83 SCC Justice Cory 
 
BREAKING SILENCE: POLICE 
PERSUASION VIOLATES 
CHARTER 
R. v. Otis, 
 (2000) 151 CCC (3d) 416 (Que.C.A.) appeal 
to Supreme Court of Canada dismissed 2001 
 
The accused was questioned by the 
police following the discovery of the 
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persuasion in breaking a person’s silence after they 
have chosen to remain silent.  
 
8
 
Common Law Voluntariness (the Crown’s Burden) 
 
It has long been recognized that a statement obtained 
by the police that is not voluntary, i.e. induced through 
promises or threats, is inadmissible under the common 
law. More recently, an emphasis has also been placed on 
the “mental state” of the suspect resulting from the 
circumstances under which the statement was made 
which may create “an atmosphere of oppression or 
intimidation” even though no promises or threats are 
made. In prescribing meaning to the term “oppression”, 
Proulx J.A. for the unanimous Court of Appeal stated: 
 
“Oppression” should be understood as anything which tends 
to undermine or which does in fact undermine the 
voluntary nature required of a “voluntary” confession. The 
circumstances surrounding an interrogation, including the 
time, date and length, the frequency of interrogations, the 
rest time granted to the subject, feeding and personality 
of the subject, all constitute elements which may be taken 
V
Fbody of a three-year-old girl 
reported missing by her mother. 
he girl died from violent blows causing abdominal 
emorrhaging and was found near a cottage owned by 
he accused’s father and occupied during the preceding 
ays by the accused, the deceased girl’s mother, and 
er two children (including the deceased). At the police 
tation, the mother of the murdered girl provided a 
tatement that led to the arrest of the accused. He 
as informed of his right to counsel and met with a 
egal aid lawyer for 32 minutes. Later in the evening, 
hortly past midnight, the accused was subject to a 
ideotaped interrogation lasting 90 minutes by a lone 
olice investigator who was a specialist in interrogation; 
uring the last 45 minutes the accused confessed to 
he murder. At trial, the judge found the accused had 
n operating mind despite a difficulty in expressing 
imself, limited vocabulary, limited cognition, and low 
ntellectual quotient. However, midway through the 
nterrogation and prior to the confession, the Court 
ound the accused experienced a “psychological 
isintegration, and was no longer able to resist or 
xercise his free choice to speak or remain silent”; at 
his point the accused no longer possessed an operating 
ind. The confession was held to be inadmissible and a 
ury acquitted the accused. The Crown appealed the 
rial judge’s decision to the Quebec Court of Appeal. 
t the heart of the appeal was the scope of police 
                                                
3 R. v. Bernshaw (1995) 95 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC) 
into consideration in determining whether or not 
oppression exists. (footnotes omitted) 
 
The onus on proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
statement is voluntary rests with the Crown who seeks 
to introduce it. Where a statement is not proven to be 
voluntary, the confessions rule demands its exclusion. 
 
Charter (the Accused’s Burden) 
 
With all Charter rights, the onus on proving a violation 
on a balance of probabilities rests with the accused. 
Although section 24(2) of the Charter provides a 
remedy for exclusion, it is not automatic like a breach 
of the confessions rule. Where a person has made a 
choice not to make a statement, the police are not 
entitled to use their superior power to override the 
person's will and negate the person's choice. However, 
evidence acquired from a suspect will only amount to a 
s.7 violation if the method used by the police infringed 
the right to choose to remain silent. Police persuasion, 
short of denying the suspect the right to choose or 
depriving them of an operating mind, does not breach 
the right to silence. In providing some pragmatic 
guidelines, the Court of Appeal outlined the following 
principles in defining the scope of the police power of 
persuasion in convincing a person to confess to a crime 
despite having indicated an intention to remain silent: 
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 • Police officers are entitled to attempt to obtain 
confessions during an investigation not withstanding an 
expressed intent to remain silent 
• When a person raises their right to silence it cannot 
be ignored and the police cannot pursue action as if 
the person had waived their right 
• Is assessing whether a confession is voluntary both 
subjective and objective factors must be examined 
• Police officers cannot use their superior power as 
representatives of the state to override the 
detainee’s will thereby negating their choice to speak. 
The police cannot “abuse [the right to silence] by 
ignoring the will of the suspect and denying [them the] 
right to make a choice”. 
• If a detainee exerts their right to counsel under 
s.10(b) of the Charter, the interrogation must be 
suspended until the person has been afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel. 
 
In this case, the accused had clearly stated on four 
occasions within a short period of time that he wished to 
“put an end to the interrogation” and consult his lawyer; 
there was no vagueness about the intent expressed by 
the accused to end the interrogation. In combination 
with the accused’s limited cognitive and intellectual 
capacity, the ongoing interrogation breached the 
accused’s right to silence and justified exclusion of the 
statement under s.24(2) of the Charter. Having found 
the statement inadmissible under the Charter it was not 
necessary for the Appeal Court to determine if it was 
involuntary. However, if it had to rule on voluntariness, 
the Court would have found the statement was obtained 
in the circumstances contrary to the confessions rule. 
 
COURT ORDERED APOLOGY 
UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Pine,  
(2002) Docket:C36357 (OntCA) 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled a 
c
 
 
The appeal Court found an apology to be “entirely 
subjective” and it would be fruitless and not a genuine 
expression of remorse if mandated by a court. The 
conditional sentence was varied to reflect the Court’s 
judgment on this condition.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
ONTARIO’s HIGH COURT 
EXAMINES POWER OF ARREST 
R. v. Asante-Mensah,  
(2001) Docket:C24828/C25026 (OntCA) 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal recently 
examined a citizen’s powers of arrest. 
In this case, the accused had earlier 
been acquitted of resisting arrest 
when an airport ground inspector attempted to arrest 
the accused under Ontario’s provincial Trespass to 
Property Act. The trial judge held that the inspectors, 
who were merely civilians and not peace officers, were 
not entitled to use force to effect the arrest and the 
accused was therefore entitled to resist. Ontario’s 
highest Court granted the Crown’s appeal and entered a 
conviction on the resist charge. In its lengthy judgment, 
the Court made the following comments of interest: 
 
• “the citizen’s power of arrest preceded that of the 
law enforcement officer. The latter is a species of 
the former, not the reverse. It follows that it is not 
appropriate to treat a citizen’s power to arrest as 
exceptional or as a partial derivative of the powers 
possessed by peace officers” 
• “the right to use reasonable force is, in the eyes of 
the common law, simply part and parcel of the right 
to make an arrest” 
• “it is well accepted in Canada that a police officer 
has the right to use reasonable force to effect an 
arrest” 
• “s.25 of the Criminal Code does not confer powers 
V
Fcourt ordered apology imposed as 
part of a conditional sentence for a 
sexual assault was unreasonable. The 
ondition read as follows: 
The accused shall, with the assistance of his conditional 
sentence supervisor, write a letter of apology to [the 
victim] admitting his wrong, and apologizing for the harm 
done to her.   
olume 2 Issue 2 
ebruary 2002 upon police officers or others, but rather shields 
them from civil or criminal prosecution if they act 
on reasonable and probable grounds in the exercise 
of their authority and use reasonable force for that 
purpose.” 
• “[s.25 of the Criminal Code] serves…as a “shield” and 
not as a “sword”, and accordingly does not represent 
a legislative attempt to deal exhaustively with the 
use of force by those conducting arrests” 
• “at common law, an arrest does not end with the 
initial apprehension of the suspect. A private person 
19
 who effects an arrest without warrant is obliged to 
turn the person arrested over to the authorities to 
be dealt with according to law. The purpose of an 
arrest is to ensure the party arrested is brought to 
justice, and the common law defines arrest in terms 
of a continuing act, not just the initial apprehension 
and assertion of control” 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
DRUNK ARREST DOES NOT 
INVALIDATE SUBSEQUENT 
CRIMINAL CHARGES 
R. v. Campbell, 2001 PESCTD 77 
 
Police arrested the accused after 
they were called to a restaurant to 
remove a male patron from the bar. 
After making some initial inquiries, 
police found the accused sitting on the floor in the 
hallway outside the women’s bathroom. She appeared 
extremely intoxicated to the arresting officer and was 
unresponsive to his requests for her to stand. The 
officer arrested the accused under Prince Edward 
Island’s Liquor Control Act for being “drunk in a public 
place”. The accused was screaming, using foul language, 
and physically resisted the officers.  
 
When filling out the information in response to the 
incident the officer charged the accused with causing a 
disturbance while being drunk contrary to s.175(1)(a)(ii), 
causing a disturbance by screaming and using obscene 
language contrary to s.175(1)(a)(i), and obstructing a 
police officer contrary to s.129 of the Criminal Code. 
The accused was not charged with the offence that 
formed the basis for the initial arrest, drunk in a public 
place.  
 
The accused was convicted at trial of causing a 
disturbance by screaming, swearing, and using obscene 
language and the obstruction charge, but was acquitted 
of the charge of causing a disturbance by being drunk. 
She appealed, arguing that the arrest was illegal, 
therefore she was lawfully entitled to resist. In 
rejecting the appeal, MacDonald C.J.T.D.  found the 
initial arrest pursuant to the Liquor Control Act valid 
and charging her with another offence subsequent to 
that arrest did not render the initial arrest invalid. Even 
though the accused was acquitted of the charge of 
causing a disturbance by being drunk, the validity of the 
arrest does not necessarily affect the ensuing criminal 
charges flowing from and subsequent to the arrest. 
Following the lawful arrest, the accused did resist and 
obstruct the officers and therefore the conviction 
under s.129 of the Code stood. However, the Court 
overturned the accused’s conviction for causing a 
disturbance because there was no evidence that a 
disturbance as contemplated by the section occurred or 
that it was the verbal outbursts, and not the police 
presence, that generated the curiosity of the onlookers. 
 
Complete case available at www.gov.pe.ca/courts/supreme 
 
CRIMINAL HARASSMENT: 
“THREATENING CONDUCT” 
DEFINED 
R. v. George, 2002 YKCA 2 
 
The accused successfully appealed his 
conviction of criminal harassment by 
engaging in “threatening conduct” 
directed at another person pursuant to 
s. 264(2)(d) of the Criminal Code. The Yukon Court of 
Appeal (which is made up of justices of B.C.’s Court of 
Appeal) reviewed the various case authorities concerning 
“threatening conduct” and defined it as follows: 
 
 [I]n order to achieve the objective of s. 264, the threat 
described in s.264(1)(ii)(d), must amount to “a tool of 
intimidation which is designed to instill a sense of fear in 
the recipient.” Whether or not this is the case is an 
objective question. Here, the question is as follows: did 
[the accused] commit an action which could be 
characterized as a tool of intimidation and by which he 
meant to instill fear in the complainant? (emphasis added) 
 
And further: 
 
Instilling a sense of something undesirable to come is 
indeed engaging in an act designed to instill a sense of 
fear. Intimidation may occur as a result of restraining a 
person’s ability to act. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
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